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Abstract: This study comprises a qualitative analysis of the governance structures within the two
largest agricultural cooperatives in Sweden, both of which have large and heterogeneous memberships,
as well as sizeable and complex business operations. Interviews were conducted with district council
members and representatives from the boards of directors. The data from both case cooperatives
indicate a genuinely traditional democratic member governance structure. There is a great deal of
social capital in the governance system. A tentative explanation of the member involvement is that the
cooperatives’ equity capital is owned by the individual members, and the members are free to sell and
buy their shares at a market rate. The members are satisfied with the return on the capital they have
invested in the cooperatives. They receive bonus shares and dividends above what most members
would get in other investments. A conclusion is that very large cooperatives may succeed well with
a member-democratic governance system of the traditional cooperative type, which in this case is
probably due to the members’ satisfaction with the individualized ownership of the cooperatives.
Keywords: hybrid cooperative; agency costs; social capital; dividend; bonus share; preferred shares;
board of directors
1. Introduction
The study presents unique cases about the ways in which large agricultural cooperatives could
contribute to sustainability. Since the two investigated cooperatives introduced individualized
ownership structures, more social capital within the memberships have strengthened the member
democracy, whereby the cooperatives have added to the economic, social, cultural and environmental
sustainability for their members, as well as for non-members, the countryside and society at large [1].
The investigated cooperatives play a major role in the Swedish agricultural sector, and they—as well
as their predecessors—have been important throughout the history of Swedish cooperatives [2–4].
This study investigates the internal governance of the two largest agricultural cooperatives in
Sweden. Both of them have diversified operations and heterogeneous memberships. “The internal
governance refers to the decision-making processes, the role of different governing bodies, and the
allocation of control rights to management (and the agency problems that goes with delegation of
decision rights)” [5] p. 6.
The most often mentioned governing bodies in cooperative governance are a general assembly
and a board of directors [6]. A general assembly is where the members gather to decide about their
cooperative’s strategic issues and to monitor the performance of the chief executive officer (CEO), who
is appointed by the board to execute the strategic plans [7,8]. However, in a large cooperative, the
general assembly consists of delegates, who are elected at district meetings. Each district is headed
by a district council, which consists of members who are elected at district meetings [9,10]. As the
district councils elect delegates to the general assembly, they constitute links between the membership
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and the board of directors. Except for electing representatives to the general assembly, the district
councils update the board about rank-and-file members’ opinions, and inform the membership about
the board’s decisions and the cooperative’s performance. By focusing on the boards of directors and
the district councils, the present study comprises the entire governance chain, from the members to the
district councils, the general assembly, the board of directors, and finally the CEO.
Like other business organizations, cooperatives are hierarchically structured. Cooperatives,
however, consist of two hierarchies: one for the membership organization (the society), and another
one for business operations (the firm). The present study concerns only the membership organization.
Power is successively delegated from the lower echelon of the membership organization to the next one
up. A good governance structure is designed so that the higher echelons work in the interests of the
lower ones [11]. Cooperative governance structures have become more varied during recent decades.
Due to increasing vertical and horizontal integration, many cooperatives have complex operations,
and the memberships have become large and heterogeneous. Many cooperatives have thus introduced
non-traditional governance models [12–14].
The non-traditional governance models have gained the attention of researchers. A span of
governance models have been explained in terms of members’ property rights and control rights [15].
Authors have identified different governance models among European agricultural cooperatives [6]
and on a global scale [16]. These studies have an aggregate approach, and are therefore not fully
compatible with studies which are based on data from within the cooperatives; as such, they study the
specific governance, for example in New Zealand [17,18], member reactions to changing governance
structures [11], member involvement in governance [19,20], the influence of non-member directors,
and, not the least, the relations of CEOs with their board of directors [5,6,16,21–24].
When it comes to explaining why cooperatives have chosen one governance model or the
other, the state of knowledge is, however, unclear, which is the reason for the present study. Some
researchers suggest that cooperatives with complex and large business operations tend be governed by
externally-recruited directors, because the members are not sufficiently qualified [6,8,16,25,26]. Other
researchers have suggested that the cooperatives’ financial structure affects the government system,
because external financiers will demand formal influence [15,24]. Surveys among US cooperatives,
however, do not support the hypothesis about a relationship between the governance structure and
the financial structure [27,28].
The present study challenges the claim of an alignment between the cooperatives’ governance
structures and their financial structures. The two investigated cooperatives adhere strictly to the
democratic member principles, which are typical for traditional cooperatives. The cooperatives’
strategies concerning market-based and differentiated pricing, as well as individualized member
capital, however, do not follow the traditional cooperative principles. The explanation is that, owing to
the democratic member governance policy, the cooperatives receive member support for untraditional
marketing and financial strategies, and these are instrumental in the provision of members’ benefits.
The aim of this study is to explore the logic behind the governance structure of cooperatives, for
which the two largest Swedish agricultural cooperatives provide the empirical basis. The study adds to
the theoretical understanding about the factors that affect cooperatives’ choices of governance structures.
For institutional reasons, the two investigated cooperatives are not representative for agricultural
cooperatives at large, in Sweden or elsewhere. The legislation on cooperatives varies among countries
and over time. Swedish law does not set any limits on how much money cooperatives can transfer to
their members and still enjoy single taxation. This allows transferability for equity, and the cooperatives
may have a variety of financial instruments. In spite of these peculiarities, the findings of this study
may have a general and theoretical value, as they indicate the ways in which a cooperative’s choice of
government model is related to individualized member ownership and the cooperatives’ business
relations with members, while previous studies have focused on governance structures in relation to
other financial structures.
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Section 2 presents a conceptual framework in which it is posited that the agency problems that
are immanent in the governance of large cooperatives can be understood in terms of measures for the
support of social capital. Section 3 describes the two case cooperatives. Section 4 gives an account of
the data collection procedure. In Section 5, the observations from a series of interviews are summarized,
while Section 6 comprises a discussion of the ways in which the data can be interpreted in terms of
social capital. Section 7 presents conclusions about the links between governance, ownership, and
marketing principles.
2. Conceptual Framework
2.1. The Costs of Internal Governance
Some cooperatives have small and homogeneous memberships, and simple, member-related
operations. The entire membership can gather at general assembly meetings, and the members
make decisions on the cooperative’s strategies. Thus, the members have low costs for running their
cooperative. Personal acquaintances mean trust, and the members will have similar notions about
their cooperative’s mission. These conditions were prevalent when practically all existing cooperatives
were young, but they can still be found in many small cooperatives [29]. However, it became necessary
to have a leader, as many of the small cooperatives expanded. This person was often a trusted member
or a farmer’s son. This entailed increasing, but still relatively low, monitoring costs. Communication
was simple through personal contacts. The interdependence between members, as well as between
members and leadership, fostered social capital.
As time passed, intensified competition and a quest for low processing costs through large-scale
operations gave rise to many mergers. Thus, cooperative memberships have grown to thousands, or
tens of thousands. If members of a large and heterogeneous membership are to unite about conditions
that everybody agrees on, there will be high collective decision-making costs. “Collective decision-making
costs arise with the adoption of costly processes to address patron interest heterogeneity and/or
inefficient decisions that fail to maximize the aggregate welfare of the owners as a group” [16], p. 21.
Hansmann [30] suggests the delegation of authority to committees as a way of reducing collective
decision-making costs. As the delegation of power in the member hierarchies has come to comprise
several echelons, the distance between members and leadership has increased. Instead of collective
decision-making costs, cooperatives have higher democracy costs in the form of meetings and
information letters, etc. [31,32]. However, these cost increases are outweighed by the production cost
savings, owing to economies of scale. In the same manner, more efficient production has compensated
for the higher cost to members of monitoring leadership in the form of incentive schemes, auditing,
policy documents, annual reports, and meetings at different organizational echelons, etc.
When a cooperative’s operations become more complex and the membership organization is
split into several layers, there will also be agency costs. Agency costs are a consequence of information
asymmetry, which arises when somebody, due to their superior knowledge, is able to reap unduly-high
benefits [33]. The principals, i.e., the members of a cooperative, will suffer as the agent, i.e., leadership,
extracts part of the residuals that the members are entitled to in their role as owners and users.
Agency theory is based on the assumption of opportunism, i.e., self-interest seeking with guile. Some
humans may sometimes seek advantages for themselves, even to the extent that they are not honest
with others. Due to information asymmetry, the leaders of a hierarchically-structured organization
are in a position to deceive others [34]. CEOs are in a special position to act opportunistically, as they
are tasked with the execution of the decisions made by the boards, and a board may have difficulties
in monitoring the CEO. There may also be opportunistic behavior in other relationships within the
membership hierarchy. Even elected representatives can be deceptive.
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2.2. Agency Costs and Social Capital
Cooperatives with large and heterogeneous memberships are more likely to suffer from agency
problems, and so are cooperatives with complex businesses [35]. Under these conditions, the amount
of social capital within the membership may be so low that the members do not make sufficient efforts
to govern the cooperative [36].
Cooperatives have been characterized as being based on the existence of social capital within the
membership [37,38]. For internal governance to result in the coordination of activities and a good
allocation of resources, there is a need for social capital among members, elected representatives at
different levels, and management. [39] p. 6, specify three attributes of social capital: “the fabric of trust,
shared values and understanding that allows diverse participants to work together towards collective
outcomes and common goals”.
Trust: interpersonal relationships can lead to trust, reciprocity, and solidarity [40,41]. Trust is “the
willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the
other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or
control that other party” [42] p. 712. However, the trust evaporates if a trusted partner is found to be
dishonest. Therefore, trust is more likely in long-term relationships, and when the parties are mutually
dependent on each other. The relationships between members and elected representatives at different
levels of the membership hierarchy reduce the information asymmetry of the organization, and thus
the amount of trust increases. Elected representatives are often keen to have a good reputation.
Shared values: elected representatives have the task of facilitating information exchange, which
contributes to interest alignment, mutual relations, values, norms, a motivational structure, and
social skills, all of which facilitate communication. Researchers have formulated so-called ‘cooperative
values’, claiming that the cooperative principles originate from a specific set of human values, such
as equality, fairness, and democracy [43–45]. These values are supported by legislation, statutes,
contracts, information, and other cooperative phenomena, but they cannot, in themselves, guarantee
low agency costs. More interest alignment is achieved through shared values, and more common
norms are fulfilled.
Understanding: interaction fosters social norms, which contribute to cohesion. Social exchanges
between equals stimulate a feeling of community. Because cooperative legislation and statutes stress
the equal and fair treatment of members, there is the probability that mutual understanding will evolve.
Networking facilitates collaboration and stimulates learning [40,46]. Networks can be characterized
by bonding and bridging social capital. While bonding social capital refers to social networks of closely
related people—such as family, close friends, and neighbors—bridging social capital exists among
loose friendships and colleagues [47]. Bonding social capital provides personal support and access to
resources, and is crucial in the creation and nurturing of community organizations [10,47].
In short, social capital affects people’s involvement in collective activities, such as the governance
of cooperatives [48,49]. Reciprocity is expected in well-functioning governance processes, i.e., it
provides a service to others with the expectation that the kindness will be returned [41]. A key concept
is legitimacy, i.e., that the membership thinks that the leaders govern the cooperative in a way that is in
the membership’s interest.
3. The Case Cooperatives
3.1. Sweden’s Largest Agricultural Cooperatives
This study analyzes the governance of the two largest Swedish agricultural cooperatives, namely
Lantmännen, which is a grain marketing and farm input cooperative, and Södra Skogsägarna
(hereinafter ‘Södra’), which is a forestry cooperative. In Sweden, forestry cooperatives are considered
to be a branch of agricultural cooperatives because about half of the country’s productive forestland is
owned by farmers and other individuals [50].
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The number of Swedish agricultural cooperatives has fallen to approximately twenty due to
mergers and acquisitions [3]. This means that there are both large and small cooperatives; some of these
are market-dominant, while others apply a niche strategy [29]. The two case cooperatives dominate
many of the markets in which they operate. Table 1 presents the cooperatives’ net sales, equity ratios,
patronage refunds, dividends to members, and other details.
Lantmännen has about 25,000 members, while Södra has about 50,000 members. Lantmännen
allows active agricultural producers throughout Sweden to become members. Södra requires that a
member owns forestland in the southern part of the country. Some Lantmännen members in southern
Sweden own forestland in addition to their agricultural land, and therefore also belong to Södra.
Even though both cooperatives have extensive international operations, there are no members from
other countries.
The case cooperatives have an open membership policy in accordance with traditional cooperative
principles and Swedish legislation, i.e., they have equal voting rights and delivery rights for members.
However, both cooperatives have traits of being non-traditional, or hybrid, cooperatives because their
members have—to a large extent—individualized ownership, and thus the cooperatives are partly
profit-seeking. This is also supported in that the cooperatives’ business relations with their members
are strictly based on market considerations, while solidarity in the form of cross-subsidization and
other traditional cooperative principles has been abandoned.
The introduction of individualized ownership in the case cooperatives took place over some years,
starting in about 2000 (Södra) and 2010 (Lantmännen). One reason was that the farmers are becoming
fewer, have increasingly large farming operations, have large investments, and are professional, all of
which indicate an trend towards a focus on economic benefits and an individualistic mentality [4,51].
In order to keep member involvement, business volumes, and equity, the cooperatives adapted to
the emerging member requirements. The benefits of the individualized ownership are confirmed by
surveys that the cooperatives’ member relations offices conduct regularly, and by surveys conducted
by researchers [1,52,53].
The individualized ownership structure of the investigated cooperatives is congruent with the
definition of cooperatives: “In a cooperative, the user is the focal point, with the direct status of user,
owner, and control vested in the same individual” [54] p. 85. This definition does not claim anything
about collective versus individual ownership, nor do other conceptualizations [30]. Nevertheless,
other Swedish cooperatives have kept their traditional financial structure, with non-tradable shares
and a large amount of unallocated equity. They would not have a large enough amount of tradable
shares to be attractive to any bank to function as a market maker, and none of them have such a stable
financial status and such good performance as the two case cooperatives.
The next two subsections give an overview of the two case cooperatives’ development, business
operations, ownership, and member composition. The presentation of the governance structures is
merged in the subsequent subsection because the two cooperatives are similar in this respect.
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Table 1. Financial status and economic performance of the case cooperatives. Sources: [55,56].
Financial Status, 31 December 2016 Lantmännen Södra
Total capital, MSEK * 32,490 21,869
Equity ratio, % 42.7 55.0
Composition of member capital (equity
and other member investments)
# common shares including bonus
shares, %
16
The members’ obligation to own
common shares is in proportion to
member patronage, and it is
redeemed at par value upon
member exit.
Bonus shares are freely tradable
among members at market rate.
26
Neither common shares nor bonus
are redeemed by the cooperative
but are sold to another member at
market rate.
# preferred shares, % 21 12
# unallocated capital, % 62 62
Performance, 2016 Lantmännen Södra
Net sales, MSEK * 37,244 18,482
Operating margin, % 4.6 5.4
Return on operating capital, % 8.4 7.0
Return on equity, % 11.0 6.0
Patronage refunds, % of member
business volume
2.5 (grain and inputs)
0.5 (machinery) 8
The cooperative’s provision of bonus
shares, % on common shares
3.0
Three-quarters are based on
member investments and
one-quarter on member business
volume
10.0
Based on member common shares,
not redeemed by the cooperative
but sold to another member
Dividends, % on common shares 9.0 4.0
Dividends, % on preferred shares 7.25 5.7
Average number of employees 9880 3594
* 100 SEK is 10.37 USD, or 9.48 EUR.
3.2. Business and Financial Structures
3.2.1. Lantmännen
Development: Lantmännen (Source: [55]) is the result of a large number of mergers among
smaller cooperatives; the oldest was established in 1880. The present cooperative was created in
2001 through an almost-nationwide merger of nine regional cooperatives, creating a new nationwide
cooperative. It is one of the largest agri-business firms in Northern Europe. The cooperative is
continually expanding its operations, mainly in foreign markets. Lantmännen has production plants in
more than twenty countries.
Business operations: business operations are split into five divisions. The members have business
relations only with ‘Division Agriculture’, which represents 27% of the cooperative’s sales. This division
purchases all types of crops and sells all types of farm inputs, such as seed, pesticides, fertilizers,
and machinery. In 2016, 41% of the grain was exported. The division operates in accordance with
traditional cooperative principles. Given the heterogeneity of the membership, the cooperative is keen
on avoiding cross-subsidization, and thus the prices that the cooperative offers its members are based
on market considerations. All of the profits that the division makes are reimbursed to the members in
the form of patronage refunds, the issuance of bonus shares, dividends on common shares, and bonus
shares. The bonus shares are freely tradable among the membership at market prices.
The other four divisions are profit-seeking. The largest one, ‘Division Food’ (36%), processes
member and non-member grain into flour, bread and cakes, pasta, cereals, and other products. These
products are sold under an array of well-known brand names in many markets. The other divisions
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are ‘Division Machinery’ (29%), Division Energy (bio-ethanol and alcohol) (7%), and ‘Division Real
Estate’ (1%).
Ownership: members are obliged to own common shares in direct proportion to their volume of
business with the cooperative, although payment is made over many years through deductions from
the payments from the cooperative. In order to finance the four profit-seeking divisions, Lantmännen
sells preferred shares to members. These are freely tradable between members at a market rate. At
least 40% of the profits made in the profit-seeking divisions are paid to members as dividends on
their preferred shares. The capital return of members is far higher than they could get in most other
investments (Table 1). The remaining 60% goes to the unallocated funds, which are later converted
into bonus shares.
Membership heterogeneity: the Lantmännen membership is quite heterogeneous. Its large
geographical spread means that its members have different production conditions. The members may
have all types of agricultural production. Many are part-time farmers. Some members produce grain,
which the cooperative converts into animal fodder to be sold to other members. Grain-producers and
animal breeders are likely to sell their products and buy farm inputs regularly, but their solidarity
cannot be counted on. While most members are interested mainly in their role as patrons, others want
returns on their investments in the cooperative.
3.2.2. Södra
Development: Södra (Source: [56]) was established in 1938, but since then, a few neighboring
forestry cooperatives have been included, whereby Södra’s operations have come to comprise the most
productive forestland in Sweden. The cooperative has—during the last five to ten years—successively
developed a specific model for individualized member ownership, implying that members are
incentivized to invest in the cooperative.
Business operations: the cooperative’s business operations cover the entire process, from planting
new trees to processing the various components of trees into marketable products. The operations take
place in four divisions. ‘Södra Forests’ is the member-related division. It buys timber from members
and offers all sorts of forest management services to its members (21% of the net sales). ‘Södra Wood’
(30%) runs sawmills and processes sawn timber into other products, such as houses. ‘Södra Cell’ (42%)
runs the paper pulp production. The remaining 7% consists of miscellaneous activities, such as wind
mills. The cooperative has many processing plants in Sweden and some neighboring countries. Södra
sell paper pulp and sawn timber to other processors. With about 57% of its production volume being
sold abroad, Södra is one of the world’s largest exporters of paper pulp and sawn timber.
The processing plants represent large investments. The paper pulp mills have a process production,
which means that they run close to their capacity ceiling. This requires an even inflow of timber, which
is attained because Södra uses the price parameter when buying timber from its members [1]. Södra
has a policy of evening out the timber price over the years, as a high price during a low business cycle
would result in volumes that cannot be handled.
Ownership: Södra’s pricing policy results in profits. About half of the profits are paid to members
as capital returns and patronage refunds, while the remainder goes to unallocated funds. The money
is paid to the members in a way that creates a balance between the members’ willingness to invest
and to deliver. The members receive patronage refunds. It is more important that Södra has a specific
set of rules regarding common shares, bonus shares, and preferred shares. When delivering timber,
the members receive common shares when a withdrawal is made from the payment for the delivered
timber. Södra has no other requirement for the member ownership of common shares.
Common shares are attractive for members not only because they get a dividend, but because
they also receive annual bonus shares in proportion to their ownership of common shares, and the
ownership of bonus shares is also rewarded with dividends. The bonus shares emanate from the
cooperative redistributing a part of its unallocated funds to its members. In addition to common
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shares and bonus shares, the members have the possibility to buy preferred shares, which are subject
to dividends as well.
Members can freely buy and sell all three classes of shares on an open market. The market for
shares and the high return on member investments are core elements in Södra’s business model,
because the members are interested in receiving a high return on their investments. The members
decide for themselves how much they want to invest in Södra. Thus, the member ownership of shares
is basically voluntary. Södra’s ownership model implies that the cooperative works according to
profit-seeking principles.
By catering to market mechanisms both for the raw product market and the capital market, Södra
can convey more money to its members than what would be possible if all of the traditional cooperative
principles were adhered to, i.e., paying a high price for timber and paying a low return on member
investments. Surveys among Södra’s members indicate high scores on member satisfaction [52,53].
Membership heterogeneity: even though all of Södra’s business operations are related to wood,
the membership is heterogeneous. A growing share of the members do not live at their properties.
Some members mainly focus on their patron role, while others consider their investor role to be more
important. Some members disapprove of Södra purchasing timber from non-members and its foreign
investments. Forest owners’ business with Södra may be quite irregular because they are in a position
to postpone their deliveries for years, and likewise, the services that the cooperative provides can be
postponed for several years.
3.3. Governance Structure
Figure 1 applies to both of the investigated cooperatives, since they follow the same legislation on
cooperatives and are subject to the same set of traditions. The similarity between the cooperatives may
also depend on the fact that both are large and have integrated a great deal forwards into processing.
The arrows in Figure 1 indicate that there are many agency relationships involved. Table 2 shows the
differences in the number of representatives in the various assemblies.
Table 2. Facts on the investigated cooperatives. Sources: [55,56].
Lantmännen Södra
Districts 20 36
Average number of members per district 1258 1410
Average number of seats in district councils 7 12
Member-directors on the board of directors 9 9
Delegates in the general assembly 101 200
Delegates in the advisory council 23 36
Expert directors on the board of directors 2 1
Number of lay auditors 3 2
Members of the board’s nomination committee 9 9
Sustainability 2020, 12, 9073 9 of 19
Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 19 
 
Figure 1. The governance structure of the two case cooperatives. The arrows show that individuals at 
one organizational level are elected to another level in the organization, while the CEO is appointed 
by the board. Source: inspired by [10]. 
Table 2. Facts on the investigated cooperatives. Sources: [55,56]. 
 Lantmännen Södra 
Districts 20 36 
Average number of members per district 1258 1410 
Average number of seats in district councils 7 12 
Member-directors on the board of directors 9 9 
Delegates in the general assembly 101 200 
Delegates in the advisory council 23 36 
Expert directors on the board of directors 2 1 
Number of lay auditors 3 2 
Members of the board’s nomination committee 9 9 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the members belong to geographically-defined districts. A district 
council is elected at the annual district assembly meetings. The chairpersons of the district councils 
constitute the general assembly, which meets once per year. The general assembly elects the board of 
directors. Swedish legislation does not require advisory councils, but such have existed for an 
extended period in both cooperatives. All of the advisory council members are elected by the general 
District Assembly, held annually in each district in the 
presence of board and management representatives 
District Councils, elected by the district assembly. 
Board of Directors, elected at the general assembly. 
External directors may be elected in addition to 
farmer-member directors. Trade unions elect three 
directors in accordance with Swedish law. 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
Nomination Committee, elected by the 
general assembly with the task of proposing 
directors for the next year’s general assembly. 
Members, divided into geographically defined 
districts. 
District Nomination Committee, elected 
by the district assembly with the task of 
proposing district council delegates at the 
next year’s district assembly. 
The Advisory Council meets a few times 
per year for the purpose of information 
exchange. The delegates are district 
council chairpersons, the cooperative 
directors, the lay auditors, and the 
chairperson of the nomination committee. 
Auditors: A few members are elected to 
be lay auditors, in addition to an auditing 
bureau. 
General Assembly, mainly consists of district council 
chairpersons. 
Figure 1. e er ance structure of the t o case cooperatives. e arro s sho that individuals at
one organizational level are l cted to another lev l in the organization, while the CEO is appointed by
the board. Source: inspired by [10].
The Swedish law on cooperatives prescribes a traditional governance structure. The general
assembly is the highest decision-making body in a cooperative. The general assembly in larger
cooperatives consists of delegates, who are elected by district assemblies to which all members are
invited [10]. When this two-tier system was introduced to substitute the former three-tier system—with
local, regional, and apex levels—the cooperatives obtained substantially lower democracy costs, as the
number of elected representatives was reduced [57].
The board members are elected by the general assembly. Both of the investigated cooperatives
elect a few non-member experts as directors. Likewise, the CEO takes part in many board meetings,
and the top management in both cooperatives has a good reputation in the Swedish business world.
As can be seen in Figure 1, the members belong to geographically-defined districts. A district
council is elected at the annual district assembly meetings. The chairpersons of the district councils
constitute the general assembly, which meets once per year. The general assembly elects the board of
directors. Swedish legislation does not require advisory councils, but such have existed for an extended
period in both cooperatives. All of the advisory council members are elected by the general assembly.
Their task is to control and assess the work of the board and the CEO. An advisory council, which has
no decision rights, meets a few times a year, together with the board members, the chairpersons of
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the district councils, a few other chairpersons from the largest districts, the chairperson of the general
assembly’s nomination committee, and the lay auditors [10].
Nomination committees are not required by law, but they exist whenever an election is to take
place [58]. A committee proposes one candidate for each of the positions that are to be filled. The
committee members are elected at the preceding year’s assembly meeting from among the members.
The general assembly not only appoints an auditing bureau, but also elects lay auditors from
among the members. A few members are tasked with the analysis of the work of the board and
the CEO. This practice has been followed in all cooperatives for an extended period, but no legal
requirements exist.
4. Data Collection
This study requires a qualitative approach in the form of case studies [59–61]. It was not possible to
specify beforehand which data were needed in order to outline the governance of the two cooperatives.
There was a need for two-way communication with follow-up questions. For that purpose, the data
was collected through semi-structured interviews with key informants. The interviews were conducted
either in person or by phone.
During the summer of 2016, the research team conducted interviews with eight delegates of
Lantmännen’s district councils and six delegates from Södra’s district councils, mainly face-to-face
at the interviewees’ farms, throughout the cooperatives’ operating areas. The interviewees were
identified through a process of random sampling. During the spring and summer of 2017, telephone
interviews were conducted with the chairperson, two other directors of Lantmännen, the head of
member relations, and the CEO. The corresponding representatives were interviewed at Södra, but the
chairperson declined due to limited time, and unfortunately, it was not possible to set a new date for
an interview.
All of the interviews were recorded. Written summaries were sent to the respondents with a
request for eventual corrections. All of the interviewees responded. Most of them had no corrections
to the summaries. The few comments were of a clarifying nature.
The semi-structured interviews were conducted with one set of questions for each interview with
the district council delegates in both cooperatives, and another set of questions for the interviews with all
of the board representatives in both cooperatives. Because the interviews focused on ways of handling
agency problems, there were questions about information exchanges, meetings, responsibilities,
member involvement, and similar variables. Before the interviews, the authors compiled question
guides for the different categories of interviewees. The questions to the district council members
were categorized in the following classes: (1) in relation to the members; (2) in relation to the board;
(3) information channels and meeting arenas; and (4) the district council’s role. Likewise, the questions
concerning the boards of directors contained issues in the following categories: (1) in relation to
the district council chairpersons; (2) in relation to the management; (3) information channels and
meeting arenas; and (4) the role of the board. The following section’s account of the interview results
are categorized in the same way, while the results in Section 6 are interpreted in terms of social
capital theory.
5. Results
5.1. Lantmännen’s District Councils
Relation to the members, the district council delegates regretted that the members rarely contacted
them. The reasons mentioned were that the districts had become large, both in geographical terms and
in the number of members. Some interviewees believed that the low frequency of the contact from the
members was because the members perceived a long distance between them and the district council
delegates. There was less commitment within heterogeneous districts. Likewise, Lantmännen’s policy
of redistributing profits made the members satisfied and less active.
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Several respondents said that members read the annual reports as well as other written statements.
The members were fairly engaged in Lantmännen’s activities. The interviewees, however, raised a
concern when it comes to the member attendance at the meetings arranged by the district council.
Production-oriented meetings and farm visits were better-attended than meetings about strategic,
economic, or ‘cooperative’ issues.
Some interviewees said that it was difficult to decide which member sub-group to listen to, but
“you learn who to listen to after a while”. They stressed that it was central to always “hear members
out, but use your common sense when it comes to which opinions to transmit to the board”. They said
that it was important to develop trust among members, as well as to be good at adjusting the way in
which the communication is carried out.
Relation to the board: a core characteristic of being a district council delegate, mentioned by
the interviewees, is: “you have to consider it as a vocation”. Obtaining trust for the district council
member among the Lantmännen’s board of directors was crucial. The importance of being able to
discuss issues with the board members was also stressed. It should be kept in mind that the firm is a
cooperative, which means that short-term profits are not the only focus.
Information channels and meeting arenas: the interviewees believed that members read the
newsletter, since the issues brought up there were the same ones that members raised when meeting
district council delegates. One interviewee said: “In a way [the newsletter] is Lantmännen”. The
interviewees said that few members took the time to read the entire annual report: the main reasons
given were that the report is too verbose, with more than 100 pages. However, the summary of the
annual report was read by many members.
The interviewees considered the website to be an important source of information, as arenas for
digital meetings will be, but the respondents stressed the importance of continuously updating all of
the websites. Besides being a source of information, the Internet will be valuable for “virtual meetings”.
The respondents felt that offering courses and information meetings to members was important.
Over the years, Lantmännen has offered both courses and meetings. These have focused on being an
owner of a cooperative, how the cooperative’s operations are run, and the benefits for its members.
Every fall, Lantmännen arranges meetings about the role of being a member of a cooperative.
Most district council delegates stressed the importance of the advisory council. “It is a very
important arena for discussions and the dissemination of information”, said one respondent. The
discussions of the advisory council improved once they were made confidential. Before confidentiality
was introduced, the delegates were concerned about what issues discussed by the advisory council
could be mentioned to members. One interviewee described how he handled this: “Things I am
allowed to talk to members about, I write down, while the rest I keep in my head”.
The district councils’ role: district council delegates have a twofold task: forwarding member
opinions to the board, and explaining the decisions made by the board to the members and discussing
them, mainly at meetings but, in some cases, also in member leaflets. Some of the interviewees
mentioned that it is important to reach a situation where “both members and directors trust you,
and be able to alternate between discussing with members and directors”. The Lantmännen District
Council delegates think that there is a relatively short distance between the members and the board.
Some members even contact the directors instead of turning to district council delegates.
5.2. Södra’s District Councils
Relation to members: all of the members have their forest estates in the Södra area, but an
increasing number do not live on these estates. This group is often less involved in forestry. This leads
to problems when district meetings and activities are arranged, since most non-residential members
live far away. One way to improve attendance is to announce that an important strategic issue will be
discussed at a district meeting, and another method is to announce that one of the directors will be
attending a meeting.
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The district council delegates struggle with the low commitment of some member groups, as
well as a lack of knowledge about how cooperatives work and the markets in which Södra acts.
Some cooperative vocabulary is not understood by some members. Dealing with this requires good
communication skills and trust building.
The district council delegates said that members seldom contact them, and if they do, the contact
is usually initiated by a specific incident, for example, “when the CEO was sacked”, as one of the
respondents said. The poor member contact was explained by the merging of the districts, which
meant that some members had to travel far to attend a member meeting. The number of district council
delegates is decreasing, but the requirements put on these, in terms of interacting with members, have
remained the same, or are increasing.
One district council delegate said that one reason why members tend not to come to member
meetings is that they think the agenda mainly concerns formal issues and information from the board,
and listening to this is a waste of time. They would instead prefer to be informed through the website,
for instance. This delegate said that the members’ interest in attending meetings would increase if the
board would “present a ‘real problem’ to be discussed at the meeting”.
Another issue mentioned in the interviews was the average age of the members, which was high,
and the elderly members were more likely to attend the meetings more often than younger members.
This led to a tendency to “stick with old ideas and that younger members do not learn about the
cooperative”. Biannually, so-called ‘Owner Meetings’ are arranged, where 8–10 members are invited.
These meetings focus on issues related to the ownership of Södra. Those who attend these meetings are
usually satisfied, the respondents said, but a problem is that only a few members attend these meetings.
Relation to the board: the interviewees described the dual role of district council delegates as
both “taking care of the Södra brand, and offering ‘member service’”. They appreciated the latter role
as the most interesting. Some expressed the idea that some of the duties of the former role could be
handed over to the officials of the cooperative.
Information channels and meeting arenas: the newsletters published by the headquarters are
read by members, while the annual reports are not. As at Lantmännen, even Södra District Council
delegates admitted that they did not read the entire annual report. The district councils’ newsletters
about the events in the district were read by most members. The courses offered to members in the
district—often with forestry production content—were appreciated by many members, according to
the respondents.
The Södra Advisory Council meets three or four times a year. It is a forum for district council
chairpersons and board members. The interviewees said that the advisory council meetings are very
valuable; they decrease the distance between the districts and the board, and the issues discussed are
interesting. One of the respondents, who had been a district council delegate for Lantmännen and
attended the meetings of the Lantmännen Advisory Council, said: “it feels as if you are closer to the
board of Södra”, which he believed could be a result of the difference in the geographic size and the
scope of the two cooperatives.
The district councils’ role: each district council delegate has a certain area of responsibility, for
example, issues related to safety, policy, and rules and regulations. The idea is that a district council
should be prepared to arrange meetings and courses when the need appears. The district councils
entail “monitoring local business policy and organizing training courses and member activities”. The
delegates “play a key role in dialogues with individual members”.
Because a district council is the link between the members and the board, trust is essential. One
problem mentioned by the interviewees is that the average age in the district councils is fairly high.
Furthermore, because some members live far away from Södra’s area, there are problems relating to
meeting attendance and member commitment.
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5.3. Lantmännen’s Board of Directors
Relation to district council chairpersons: the directors highly appreciated meeting the district
council chairs at the advisory council meetings. These meetings gave the directors the possibility
to discuss strategic issues with the district council chairpersons, as well as to listen to the members’
opinions presented by the district council chairpersons. Some people also met a few times each year to
discuss issues such as “being an owner of Lantmännen”, and the strategic and financial issues.
Relation to management: all of the interviewees stressed the importance of keeping the roles of
the board and the CEO separate: “The board should focus on strategic issues, while the CEO focuses
on operational issues”. Because the CEO “controls all the resources, it is important that the board
makes the strategic decisions”. The chairperson said that the division of roles was clear and decided
upon, but “you have to constantly repeat it—especially since there are new board directors as well as
new staff in the management team”.
Lantmännen has a recurring item at the board meetings, labelled ‘information from the CEO,’
where the CEO discusses “how the board thinks he is to act in different ongoing issues, which is valuable
both for him and the board members”. The chairperson and CEO also have recurrent follow-up
meetings between the board meetings, in order to discuss current problems and developments.
The CEO is evaluated throughout the year. The CEO is asked to present quarterly financial reports
of about 40 pages at the board meetings, focusing on financial issues, as well as “a monthly report,
focusing on the results generated”. Once a year, the CEO’s performance is analyzed more deeply
during a board meeting without the CEO present. The result of this CEO evaluation is discussed by
the chairperson and the CEO.
Information channels and arenas: Lantmännen publishes a traditional annual report as well as a
report on Social Corporate Responsibility. The reports are offered to the members both via the website
and via e-mail. These extensive publications are summarized in a short publication, with a focus on
the financial data, and are offered to members on the website as well.
All of the interviewees said that the newsletters are an important information channel. The
chairperson and the CEO write about current issues and summarize recent business developments.
As a complement to the newsletter, Lantmännen has a member portal at its website, as well as a
Facebook group. This is mainly in order to reach younger members, one respondent said. Lantmännen
is convinced that there will be a need for more digital communication channels, and the cooperative is
developing such channels.
The Lantmännen Advisory Council is seen by the directors as a valuable meeting arena, especially
after these discussions became confidential. One director, who also sits on the boards of other firms,
summarized the main difference between these boards and that of Lantmännen: “the anchoring process,
without a doubt!” He said that the anchoring process, including the discussion of strategic plans in the
advisory council, has an important role, since it “gives members the possibility to understand the logic
behind the strategy discussed also in cases when members do not agree”.
The member newsletters are published on the external website about four times per year, and
usually cover 24 pages. Such newsletters treat recent market events, explain cooperative vocabulary,
and present internal facts and figures. In some districts, the newsletters are distributed by mail to
the members. In order to simplify for district council delegates, there is a policy that, when major
events are about to take place, the district council delegates should be informed at least 24 h before the
members are informed.
The role of the board: in 2016, the Lantmännen Board of Directors consisted of nine directors and
three employee representatives. The deputy chairperson said that he “has always had the opinion
that a board should not have more than seven directors”, but that opinion has now changed. He used
the argument that the risk for “freeriding directors” is higher in a large board, but now he thinks that
this risk can be balanced by the possibility of having a board that has the required competences and
time to fulfil the task of a director. Hence, his opinion today is that nine directors are necessary for
Lantmännen. The secretary of the board is the Chief Legal Officer (CLO), because it is convenient to
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have a person with legal knowledge present at the board meetings. Lantmännen has a work group
that prepares the agenda for the board meetings. The group consists of the chairperson, the deputy
chairperson, the secretary, the CEO and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO). There are 13 board meetings
per year.
The deputy chairperson said that the experience of the two external directors is very beneficial for
the board’s work. The external directors must, however, be aware of the special characteristics of a
cooperative, and must understand that close contact with members is a necessary aspect of running
a cooperative.
All of the documents needed at the board meetings are to be downloaded from the website
and read. One director said that all of the documents must reach all of the board members, and the
documents must not be spread outside the board. One goal is to introduce a similar web-based system
for documents to be read in preparation for district council meetings.
5.4. Södra’s Board of Directors
Relation to district council chairpersons: the Södra Advisory Council comprises 36 district
chairpersons, as well as the directors. This arena is highly valued by the directors. One of them said
that the advisory council is a well-functioning forum for discussions, as it supports the district council
delegates in their contact with the members. He concluded by saying: “without the advisory council,
frustration and irritation among members would easily arise and lead to a ‘we and them’ mentality,
which might threaten cooperative collaboration”.
Relation to management: Södra’s respondents stressed the importance of keeping the roles of
the board and the CEO separate. They mentioned that it is necessary to occasionally discuss this and
decide: “where the boundary between the board and CEO is”, as the deputy chairperson said.
The CEO said: “a good CEO may offset a bad board, but a good board cannot offset a bad CEO”,
concluding that the ambition is to have both a good board and a good CEO. If the chairperson and the
CEO have a good relationship, the situation is optimal, he concluded. He also stressed the importance
of the CEO knowing what is unique for cooperative governance. The chairperson and the CEO have
frequent discussions, which is a key component for reaching a point where the board contributes to
successful development. The CEO is evaluated yearly in a board meeting where he is not present. In
addition to this, the CEO is sometimes evaluated “in a deeper way”, but the interviewees thought
that it is usually sufficient to evaluate the CEO through the ongoing discussions between him and the
chairperson, and through one yearly evaluation by the board.
Information channels and arenas: the annual reports and the Corporate Social Responsibility
reports are accessible through Södra’s website, and so are the member newsletters. All of the
interviewees said that digital information channels—as well as meeting arenas—will be developed,
partly because the members require it, and partly in order to handle the members who live far from
their forest estates. Södra has a policy that at least one director and one representative from the
management team are to take part in the annual district meetings.
The advisory council constitutes a valuable meeting arena, respondents said, but more informal
meetings are arranged both between the district council delegates and the directors, and between the
latter and the members. The member relations officer is also frequently contacted by the members.
When they cannot give an answer, they forward the member concern either to the board or to the
management team.
The role of the board: the Södra Board of Directors had twelve seats in 2016. Södra had one
external director, who was appreciated by the vice chair, who was one of the interviewees. He said
that external directors bring specialized knowledge and new ideas. In 2016, Södra’s board had seven
physical meetings, and four digital meetings. The deputy chairperson said that it is important to plan
the meetings well, making sure that all of the necessary issues are dealt with annually. The Södra
Member Relations Officer acts as the board secretary, which is valuable, the deputy chairperson said,
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since this simplifies the link both between the board and the members, and between the board and the
business activities, because the CEO is also present at the board meetings.
Södra’s current CEO has been on about 50 boards over the years. He thinks this experience is
beneficial for his job. One benefit he mentioned is that he understands the two roles, i.e., the roles of
a board and a CEO, and the fact that there is an information asymmetry between the board and the
CEO. He appreciated that the chairperson and the CEO prepared the board meetings in a way that
leads to “the relevant issues being discussed at the board meetings”. The CEO said: “the relationship
between CEO and chairperson is crucial”. The board evaluates the CEO’s performance every year at a
meeting without the CEO being present. If adjustments are found to be necessary, the chairperson is
responsible for communicating this to the CEO.
6. Discussion
This study supports the conclusions of Morfi, Nilsson, Hakelius and Karantininis (in press) [4]
when these authors wrote about the essential role that social capital has in cooperative governance. A
well-functioning government depends on the elected representatives’ involvement. In accordance with
Morfi, Nilsson and Österberg (2018) [10], it was found that elected representatives’ motivations are often
various types of personal satisfaction, not least the possibility to interact with other representatives,
and with rank-and-file members. The ability to build up positive relations to others is important.
The advisory councils play a crucial role for interactions to be fruitful throughout the membership
hierarchy. The representatives from both the board of directors and the district councils appreciate
their discussion during the advisory council meetings. The meetings are important for transferring
knowledge about opinions at the grassroots and leadership levels. Participating in the advisory council
meetings is also important for the participants’ self-esteem.
For social interaction to be stimulating, the individuals must experience progress. The meetings
and discussions not only result in decisions, but they are also a confirmation of the participants’
achievements. As Eisenhardt [62] suggests, social confirmation is important when the targeted
achievement cannot be measured, such as governance tasks, for which it is not possible to construct an
effective incentive scheme. Both of the investigated cooperatives had measurable goals of a financial
character—i.e., profits, dividends, and patronage refunds—but it is not possible to estimate the ways
in which the individual elected representatives contribute to these goals.
Many members were not much involved in the governance of either cooperative. However,
the members voluntarily decided whether to abstain from participation or not. The respondents’
explanation was that member passivity is due to satisfaction and trust in the elected representatives,
which is in accordance with Nilsson and Svendsen [20]. The data indicates that passivity occurs more
often in certain member groups. Small and part-time members of Lantmännen have weak incentives
to involve themselves. Non-resident forest owners do not care much about member democracy. In
short, when small member groups are passive, there is no reason to worry, especially as these members
account for a small share of the cooperatives’ business activities.
This study supports Kronholm and Wästerlund [9] in their observation that there is a problem
when elderly members, in particular, are active, and try to influence their cooperative to follow outdated
policies. In order to handle this problem, the elected representatives must have social skills.
Information exchange is essential on all levels of the hierarchy, even though all communication is
costly [8,32]. The amount of information transferred electronically has increased. The district council
delegates communicate with their members about what takes place at higher levels of the hierarchy,
whereby they create an understanding of the mission and the structure of the cooperative’s business
operations. The members learn the logic behind the cooperative’s market strategies and financial
arrangements. They may talk about their joint interests as well as issues concerning production.
The meetings that the district councils arrange for the members of the districts contribute to the
creation of a sense of community, and even cohesion. Common norms are reinforced when members meet
and fraternize [4,63]. The members have widespread agreement about their cooperative’s financial
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and marketing orientation. The meetings have the major social significance of helping the members to
become more acquainted with each other, thereby stimulating a sense of community.
While personal meetings are likely to have a higher impact on social community, there is also
much written information within the democratic member system in the form of newsletters and
websites. Electronic communication allows for reciprocal information exchange. The newsletters
contain material written by the members.
The membership within a district is often too large to allow for personal acquaintances among
everybody, but at least the district council chairpersons are well-known among the members, whereby
there is potential to bridge social capital. It is likely that the chairpersons enjoy legitimacy and trust
among the members, especially as the chairpersons have interesting information to convey. A certain
degree of bonding social capital is likely to exist among the various district chairpersons, and between
these chairpersons and the directors, as these have regular discussions during the meetings with the
advisory council.
The heterogeneity of the memberships is reduced through information exchange. All of the members
receive the same information from headquarters. The district information given to the members
originates at the headquarters. The newsletters are perceived by the members to be informative, and they
are appreciated. Their messages are based on market considerations, which the members understand.
Even though both cooperatives had professional leadership that secured financially sound results,
their governance was characterized by a great deal of social capital [28]. Being a director is honorable,
and provides a strong network with other important people. Directors enjoy a great deal of social
capital, especially if a firm is successful. Leadership and especially the management team influence the
discussion climate among members. The cooperative CEOs had a strong position, and the chairperson
and the CEO prepared all of the board meetings jointly.
The nomination committees and the lay auditors gave legitimacy to the governance of the cooperatives.
These units ensured the members that the board of directors and the district councils could be trusted.
These bodies gave the members stronger control over their elected representatives, thus ensuring that
they fulfilled their tasks.
7. Conclusions
This study explored the logic behind the governance structures of Sweden’s two largest agricultural
cooperatives. The analyses found that the democratic member system was characterized by a large
amount of social capital throughout the membership hierarchy. The governance of the two cooperatives
followed the principles of traditional cooperation. This may seem surprising, as the cooperatives’ large
and heterogeneous memberships and their complex business operations would, according to previous
research, create member passivity.
The explanation is that the cooperatives have a hybrid character, in the sense that ownership is
largely individualized, and the business relations with the members are market based. These hybrid
attributes contributed to creating member involvement in the governance. These attributes help the
cooperatives to support the members in their roles as both patrons and owners. The investigated
cooperatives applied a policy of trading with their members on market conditions, although they also
paid patronage refunds. This policy means that the cooperatives are profit-oriented. A large part of the
profits is transferred to the members as bonus shares, and as dividends on common shares, bonus
shares, and preferred shares. As shares are tradable among the members at a market rate, the members
want their shares to have a high market price. Membership heterogeneity has less importance, since the
members have an interest in high return on their capital. They are incentivized to invest and trade with
their cooperatives, and sufficiently many members involve themselves in governance. The members
also accept that centralized power is necessary in a cooperative with complex business operations.
The investigated cooperatives enjoy legitimacy because the members consider the cooperatives
to support their economy. The elected representatives can see various problems, but they appreciate
their tasks, and they are appreciated by the members. The existence of different organizational units
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contributes to social capital in the democratic member system, which reduces agency problems within
the membership hierarchy.
A theoretical contribution of this study is the observation that cooperatives with large and
heterogeneous memberships, and with sizeable and complex operations, do not necessarily have
problems concerning their member governance. They may have a genuinely member-democratic
governance structure as a consequence of individualized member ownership and market-set trading.
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